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Evaluating D. T. Suzuki’s Role as Zen Philosopher
Rossa Ó MUIREARTAIGH
ロサ・オムラティグ
　本稿では、第一に鈴木大拙の哲学が革新的なものであるかどうかを考察し
た上で、その哲学の枠組み及び概要の提示を試みる。第二に、その哲学と鈴
木独自の日本文化論を比較検討することによって明らかになる矛盾を示唆す
る。
Introduction
 D. T. Suzuki (1870–1966) was famous in his time as an accomplished 
scholar, translator, exegete, apologist, and popularizer of Zen. However, 
his legacy as a philosopher has been not so clear. Some, such as Sakamoto 
have argued that Suzuki was “… in broader and indeed unique sense, a 
philosopher not only in the bent of his mind but also in the attitude of his 
lifelong scholarly activities” (1978: 33). There is the alternative view that his 
“affection for philosophy was that of ‘a would-be philosopher’” (Dumoulin 
1992: 8) and that Suzuki lacked the rigor and consistency to be considered 
a proper philosopher. This paper aims to argue that Suzuki did establish a 
philosophically-consistent system of beliefs that was innovative. I will try 
to demonstrate this claim by suggesting, albeit in the most general way, 
what the contours of a Suzuki philosophical system can be said to look 
like. However, I will also make the argument that Suzuki’s adoption of a 
particular interpretation of Japanese culture interfered with the coherence of 
his philosophy with the result that his conceptualization of Japanese religious 
culture creates a fundamental contradiction in his philosophy.
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Suzuki outside philosophy
 Suzuki was recognized in his time as a talented scholar, translator and 
proselytizer. However, his image as a philosopher suffered a number of 
drawbacks. First of all, there was a reluctance on his part to declare the Zen 
he was describing to be a philosophy. Consistent throughout his writings is 
an attitude that Zen can never been subsumed completely under the label of 
“philosophy”, that it is a way of being alive rather than a set of ideas. Zen is a 
set of experiences, a set of practices, and, indeed, a state of being. For instance, 
in an article entitled Zen and Philosophy he writes, “The conceptualization 
of Zen is inevitable: Zen must have its philosophy. The only caution is not 
to identify Zen with a system of philosophy, for Zen is infinitely more than 
that.” (1956: 260–261) This reluctance to give Zen a philosophy meant that 
Suzuki never had a motive for applying systematically a set of core concepts 
to Zen. Instead his writings on Zen often tend to be anecdotal, depending 
on incidents concerning the great Zen masters to illustrate a Zen attitude 
rather than a Zen philosophy. When he does apply concepts to Zen, he tends 
to promiscuously use vaguely defined terminology borrowed liberally from 
an array of religious and philosophical traditions. Whilst this can make for 
exciting and stimulating reading, it does suggest a mission to proselytize 
(upaya), to explain Zen in ‘local terms’, rather than a mission to systematize, 
to explain Zen in ‘universal tesms’.
 But more than his reluctance to set Zen in fixed conceptual terms, another 
impediment to seeing Suzuki as a philosopher has been his unrelenting anti-
rational and anti-language attitude. In this format Suzuki’s writing defied 
what was seen as the conventions of proper philosophy in the mid-20th 
Century. Kasulis has summarized this situation as follows:
 Suzuki … was not a philosopher at all, at least in the sense of formal 
training. Although his impact on Western, especially American, culture 
has been extensive in the areas of poetry, aesthetics, and general 
spirituality, his influence on Western philosophy has been nil. In fact, in 
some ways, his writings permanently alienated a significant portion of 
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a whole generation of Western philosophers. Because of their exposure 
to Suzuki, for example, many professional Western philosophers will 
never read any works on Eastern thought, not as philosophical literature, 
anyway. This is understandable when we consider than Suzuki’s greatest 
popularity in the United States was in the late 1950’s and 1960’s, about 
the same time that American philosophy had assumed a strong analytic 
orientation. To a philosopher attempting to make philosophical language 
ever more precise and philosophical statements verifiable by empirical 
data, Suzuki’s approach must have seemed outrageous … (1982: 131)
 The “strong analytic orientation” of American philosophy was the Anglo-
American tradition which placed formidable emphasis on the role of language 
in attaining ultimate truth statements. Suzuki, with his constant rejection of 
language as a reliable vehicle for attaining coherent truth, was innately 
anathema to this tradition. A typical example of Suzuki’s attitude to any kind 
of analytical-oriented thinking is as follows: “We are generally attracted to 
analytical knowledge or discriminative understanding, and we divide reality 
into several pieces. We dissect it and by dissecting it we kill reality. When we 
have finished our analysis we have murdered reality, and this dead reality we 
think is our understanding of it.” (1980: 21)
Suzuki the reluctant alternative philosopher
 Despite Suzuki’s reluctance to be described as such, and despite the 
reluctance of many in the philosophical profession to accept him as such, I 
will argue here that it is still possible to chacterize Suzuki as a philosopher. 
 First of all to the charge that Zen is not a philosophy, as Rosemont (1970) 
has pointed out, Zen as articulated by Suzuki, does make claims about reality 
and our understanding of it that can only be described as philosophical beliefs. 
To assert that Zen’s claims are not philosophy but transcend philosophy, as 
Suzuki does, is to engage in misleading rhetoric and to illegitimately claim 
privileged knowledge. Rosemont counters the Zen is not a philosophy claims 
by Suzuki as follows: 
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 In just the same way, even if it were true to say of the Zen masters 
(which it is not) that they do not hold philosophical beliefs or do not hold 
them philosophically, or even if it were true to say of Zen Buddhism in 
general (which again, it is not) that it is not a philosophy, it still would 
not be proper for the Zen commentators to emphasize this issue to the 
point of seriously misleading their readers. In their attempts to articulate 
the beliefs of the masters, to assert that those beliefs are true, and to 
defend them, the Zen commentators offer prima facie evidence that 
they themselves, at least, are holding those beliefs philosophically. And 
because the philosophical statements they make on the basis of those 
beliefs form the bulk of their writings, readers should be told at the 
outset that what they will be reading in those commentaries will be, in 
an important sense, the philosophy of Zen Buddhism. (1970: 71–72)
 In other words, if you are stating your beliefs about reality and justifying 
those beliefs, then you are doing philosophy. To express it proverbially, if it 
walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, then it is a duck—no matter how much 
it may quack on about how it transcends duckness.
 Secondly, to the charge that Suzuki bombed as a philosopher in the 
Anglo-American tradition, it is important to remember that this tradition is 
one of a handful of alternatives. There is also in the West what is called the 
“Continental tradition” and within this tradition Suzuki’s reservation about 
the truth value of language, and many of his other ideas, would not seem so 
shocking. As Kasulis further remarks (ibid.) “… there were little pockets of 
philosophical interest (especially among those in the Continental tradition) 
that did not follow the pattern of the mainstream. Heidegger himself was 
impressed by Suzuki in their personal encounters.” Indeed, philosophy has 
always been a broad church accepting a variety of methods and approaches. 
To discount a set of expressed beliefs as being no philosophy because it fails 
to fulfill narrow expectations of formal logic and objective rationalism is 
myopic. As Kasulis remarks elsewhere (1978: 354):
 When people exclude Zen Buddhist thought from the classification of 
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“philosophy,” they often use such a limited definition of “philosophy” 
that their own criteria would also exclude such classical philosophers 
as Socrates, Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas as well as modern figures 
like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and aspects of Heidegger and Wittgenstein. 
One may be justified in disliking these Western philosophers, but it 
is merely an act of a semantic sleight of hand to discount them as 
“unphilosophical.”
Faith philosopher
 Whilst Suzuki was mostly an uncritical popularizer of Zen, this is of 
no major import if we properly categorize him as essentially what could 
be termed a “faith philosopher”. A faith philosopher can be described as 
one who sees philosophy not as a path to truth but as a tool for describing 
and delineating a path that has already been discovered through faith in 
one’s beliefs, particularly when those beliefs are derived from revelatory 
experience. This primacy of faith over philosophy as the instrument of truth 
has had a long pedigree in religious philosophizing and is best summarized 
by St. Anselm’s dictum Credo ut intelligam: “I do not seek to understand 
that I may believe, but I believe in order to understand” (Freemantle 1954: 
88). Similarly, this reversal of the path connecting philosophy to faith can be 
found in Thomas Aquinas, among other religious philosophers, who believed 
that philosophy was incomplete without revelation. (Copleston 1955: 56–57). 
For Suzuki, revelation is the Zen experience and the awareness it brings; the 
beliefs about reality it gives him are the be all and end all of all religious 
enquiry. He describes the characteristic of this awareness or satori as follows, 
“… the knowledge realized by satori is final, […] no amount of logical 
argument can refute it. Being direct and personal it is sufficient unto itself. All 
that logic can do here is to explain it, to interpret it in connection with other 
kinds of knowledge with which our minds are filled.” (1956: 04).
 In essence, Suzuki’s role as philosopher was not to prove anything about 
Zen, nor to influence or inspire changes within Zen, but to bring the revealed 
truths of Zen to a new audience who sought to be spoken to in modern 
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philosophical language. A good summarizing statement of Suzuki’s attitude 
towards the role of philosophy in Zen and his understanding of his own 
mission as a philosophizer of Zen can be seen in the opening paragraphs to 
his commentaries on the Record of Lin-chi where he justifies his attempts to 
ascribe a philosophy to T’ang era Zen master Lin-chi (2000: 343–344). He 
states that within the institutional traditions of Zen, the Record of Lin-chi has 
been used and understood in a particular religious context and that he has no 
intention to add anything to this. However, he points out that modern audiences 
have developed a need and desire for philosophical explanations and that it 
is inevitable that from the many words of Rinzai a coherent ‘thought’ (shiso) 
will be discernible and transmissible to such modern audiences.
 Here we see that Suzuki is not interested in adding anything to Zen or 
to finding new ways of developing Zen. He perfectly accepts Zen in all 
its institutional and traditional forms and feels he has nothing to reveal to 
those who have already experienced Zen revelation. Instead his mission is to 
explain Zen to those outside the tradition, those who have not experienced 
its revelations, in a style and pattern of philosophical discourse they can 
understand and respect. Elsewhere in his writings, Suzuki makes the 
comment that (1974: 12) “the Western mind must help the East to construct a 
new system of thought based upon Zen experience.” In other words, the East 
has much to offer the world in terms of philosophy and ideas about life but it 
needs to articulate this with the systematic rigor of Western philosophy.
Outlines of a system
 Having made, then, the argument that Suzuki can be seen as a philosopher 
with a system of ideas, the next task is to present what this system of ideas 
looks like. With this challenge to hand, I attempt here to offer just a glimpse 
of how Suzuki’s system could be held together. It is nothing further than an 
overview, a broad brushstroke that will exclude much and simplify greatly.
-The Zen perspective: the seeing Self in the world
 The starting point for Suzuki’s ontology is a phenomenological one. It is 
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the position of ones being itself looking out on the world. This initial seeing 
self is the foundation of our knowledge of the world. He writes, “… the seeing 
plays the most important role in Buddhist epistemology, for seeing is at the 
basis of knowing. Knowing is impossible without seeing; all knowledge has 
its origin in seeing. Knowing and seeing are thus found generally united in 
Buddha’s teaching. Buddhist philosophy therefore ultimately points to seeing 
reality as it is. Seeing is experiencing enlightenment.” (1957: 40)
 In other words, ultimate knowledge does not depend on externally inputted 
religious revelation nor on empirical data to be decodified by a thinking 
brain. Instead ultimate knowledge is a primordial given, self-sufficient and 
not needing external verification. The idea of oneself existing is as a being-
in-the-world.
-The view from somewhere
 This assertion that our most basic knowledge of the world is a “subjective” 
view from somewhere, to borrow Thomas Nagel’s (1986) eponymous phrase, 
establishes Suzuki’s philosophy as something counter to the singularly 
“objective” naturalist philosophies of modern science which seek the view 
from nowhere. That is, Suzuki is opposing the naturalists’ bracketing off of 
our subjective experience, our beingness in the world, and their opinion that 
the mystery of our being in this world, the mystery that we are in the world 
seeing it from one subjective point, is a creation and product of the world out 
there, and as such, not something worthy of serious consideration. 
 For instance, according to Suzuki: 
 “The intellect looks outwardly, takes an ‘objective’ view of things. It 
is unable to look inwardly so as to grasp the thing in its inwardlyness. 
It attempts to achieve a unitive view of the world by what is known as 
the objective method. This objective method may work well, but only 
when the inside view has first been taken hold of. For the unifying 
principle lies inside and not outside. It is not something we arrive at; it 
is where we start. It is not the outcome of postulation; it is what makes 
postulation possible.” (2004: 86)
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 He made the same point at an Eric Fromm hosted conference on Zen and 
Psychoanalysis where he said:
 The sciences are uniformly centrifugal, extroverted, and they look 
“objectively” toward the thing they pick up for study. The position they 
thus assume is to keep the thing away from them and never to strive to 
identify themselves with the object of their study. Even when they look 
within for self-inspection they are careful to project outwardly what is 
within, thus making themselves foreign to themselves as if what is within 
did not belong to them. They are utterly afraid of being “subjective”. But 
we must remember that as long as we stand outside we are outsiders, 
that for that very reason we can never know the thing itself, that all we 
can know is about-which means that we can never know what our real 
self is. Scientists, therefore, can never expect to reach the Self, however 
much they desire to. They can no doubt talk a great deal about it, and that 
is all they can do. Zen thus advices us to reverse the direction science is 
pursuing if we are really to get acquainted with the Self. (1960: 25)
　For Suzuki then, the starting point for an understanding of ontology is 
not the world we see, or considerations of what made that world, but us, the 
beings in the world, as “Self” in the world. In this way, Suzuki is making 
central the very thing that is bracketed off by naturalist philosophies. 
-Pure experience as pure absorption
 This seeing self that is the starting point of Suzuki’s philosophy is not 
a consciously thinking self. As a self that is just there in the world, it is 
undifferentiated from that world, existing in a state of, what the Heddegerrian 
Hubert Dreyfus might term, “absorbed coping” (1991: 70). Suzuki describes 
this primordial state as “pure experience” and links it to the concept of 
sonomama (which I translate here as “as it is-ness”). He states (1957: 
60) “Buddhist philosophy, therefore, is the philosophy of Suchness, or 
philosophy of Emptiness, or philosophy of Self-identity. It starts from the 
absolute present which is pure experience, an experience in which there is 
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yet no differentiation of subject and object, and yet which is not a state of 
sheer nothingness. The experience is variously designated: in Japanese it is 
sonomama…” This as it is-ness is the radical message of a philosophy that 
implies a primordial being-ness, an absorbed non-judgemental self in the 
world in a state of pure experience. In this way, Suzuki reverses the Cartesian 
prioritization of the mental cognitive self over the ontological self. He evokes 
Buddha’s first words “天上天下唯我独尊 (In heaven and earth, I alone am the 
honored one)” in contradistinction to Descartes famous dictum cogito ergo 
sum: “The French philosopher Descartes has the famous “Cogito ergo sum” 
which is defined as ‘I think therefore I am’ but from Shakamuni Buddha’s 
perspective, in other words for Zen, first is ‘I am’ and after comes ‘I think’. 
This is in fact absolute affirmation, identification with absolute contradiction, 
non-dilemmatic or rather non-differentiated differentiation.” (2001b: 149)1 
 For Suzuki this non-dualist absorption, the self in the world, is the norm, 
the condition of our existence, and mental cognitivism, the thinking mind is a 
special case, a distortion and derivation. For instance, Suzuki in many places 
speaks approvingly of states of mind where the world is undifferentiated, 
such as in the mind of an infant. (2001b: 35) And suggests that this is the 
state of being we should seek—not the knowing, judging mind but the seeing, 
acceptant mind.
 Suzuki then (in keeping with Buddhist tradition), rejects any Cartesian or 
Christian-style assertions of an inner essential self, soul, or mind, where such 
an assertion creates a division with one’s corporeal, physical self. Instead 
Suzuki employs Rinzai’s concept of “person” to create a conceptualization 
of the human as a being in the world, meshed with the world (1973a: 93). 
Suzuki wants to emphasize that we are not souls placed in this world to await 
a distant salvation but that the here and now of our existence is our reality 
from which notions of eschatological transcendence are of no relevancy and 
are something we are falsely desiring. For Suzuki, notions of a world beyond 
are a pointless negation of the value of the world we are in now. Suzuki 
rejects any idea of the sacred and the profane, God and Man, the heavenly 
and the Earthly, as being distinct realms, distinct realities. The fact that we 
see such distinctions, the fact that such distinctions make sense for us is a 
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product of a false viewing of reality generated by our drive towards dualistic 
mindfulness. 
-Capping concepts of non-duality:
 However, to purport this lack of division is not to assert that all is one 
or that nothing moves and changes through time in our reality. We are still 
separate and distinct though unified. Any totalizing monism is rejected by 
Suzuki along with any divisive dualism. He is constantly at pains to assert 
that Zen, although dismissive of all dualistic distinctions, is not pantheist. For 
Suzuki reality moves in a dialect transcendent of monoism and dualism. This 
may be hard to countenance, but to the “awakened” mind of Zen such notions 
make complete sense. However, for Suzuki the philosopher, asserting that all 
will make sense once one is enlightened is not enough and in his works there 
is a constant drive to describe fully the paradox of distinctions still existent 
in oneness, a radical non-dualism that is not pantheist either. We find that 
when Suzuki reaches this ultimate dilemma of conceptualizing Zen ontology, 
he employs what I term ‘capping concepts,’ such as the notion of sunyata, 
prajna (e.g. 1956: 286), or 霊性的直覚 -spiritual direct awakening (2001b: 
92), which are designed to encapsulate this apparent paradox of non-monist 
non-duality in a transcendent category of ontology. In using these concepts 
at the apogee of his philosophical speculation, Suzuki is pushing language 
and logical conceptualization to describe a reality where divisions are 
meaningless, false illusions, but where an absence of those divisions would 
be equally un-real and illusionary. 
 And so Suzuki describes a conceptual format whereby division and 
non-division are combined in a higher spiritual dimension. However, this 
“higher” spiritual dimension cannot be seen as separate from “lower” 
spiritual dimensions, since this would create a further “division” between 
non-division and division with the need for a further potentially divisive non-
dividing dimension, all resulting in an infinite regress. 
 Instead Suzuki tends to describe his capping concepts as existing in 
what can only be apophatically described as “nothingness” and existing at 
a point of time termed the “eternal now”. In other words, for there to be 
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an ontological reality of division and non-division existing simultaneously, 
a reality of change but permanent, constant ‘is-ness’, there can be no 
distinguishing categories nor can there be any sense of moving time. All 
divisions must be happening now and all divisions must be creating nothing 
else other than their own division-ness. In essence, the capping concepts of 
Suzuki’s philosophy are designed to describe an ontology and concurrent 
epistemology where the aware mind sees the ultimate (spatial) asiety and 
(temporal) eternalism of reality.
 Eventually attempts to explain this vision of reality—seeing movement 
in time whilst rejecting notions of dualistic/dialectic changes in time, seeing 
divisions in space while rejecting the idea of a world of divisions—collapses 
into illogical violations of the law of identity as division and non-division is 
divided but not divided, the world moves but is frozen in an eternal now, the 
mind is in the world but is looking at the world. Eventually Suzuki can do no 
more than evoke the logic of the Diamond Sutra with the syllogism “A is A, 
therefore A is not A”, a logic he dubbed sokuhi. He states (2001: 86) “This 
sokuhi logic has undoubtedly been the most important thing throughout the 
history of Zen thought. Zen is in fact the translation of this behaviorally.”2 
This declaration of non-contradiction in contradiction helps Suzuki to unify 
his capping concepts and present a coherent philosophy.
 The logic of sokuhi, then, is a rational attempt to explain in philosophical 
language an awareness of reality that can only defy rationality in its 
attempts to avoid all division but, at the same time, evade a static, pantheist 
reductionism.
Universal ontologies and patriotism
 As well as producing copious works of intellectual speculation on Zen that, 
as I have tried to argue here, form an innovative new system of philosophy, 
Suzuki also labored as a cultural interpreter of Japan. He produced many 
works and articles describing what he saw as the unique features of Japanese 
culture and its artistic practices and artifacts. For Suzuki, the existence of 
the Zen religion in Japan gave the country a unique cultural form and artistic 
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sensibility, which he was proud to declare to the World. 
 There has been controversy over how far his sense of national uniqueness 
went. Victoria (1997, 2003) has in the past accused him of aggressive 
nationalist tendencies. However, this has been strongly (and convincingly) 
rebutted by Sato (2008) who demonstrates extensively that Suzuki (unusually 
for his time and place) was no ultra-nationalist. However, Sato does concede 
that “Suzuki was not without patriotic sentiment” (2008: 77). This is a 
fair assessment. There is no doubt Suzuki cherished his country and, as 
a man of his time, found no shame in professing this. But Suzuki was no 
warmonger, imperialist, or fascist. Nowhere, even in his most patriotic 
writings (i.e. Nihontekireisei (1944/1972)), does he promote Japanese 
military invasions of other countries or direct Japanese hegemony over other 
nations. His patriotism was of the inter-cultural type, suited to the discourse 
of international intellectuals, cultural exchanges, and diplomatic pleasantries. 
It was a patriotism that sought to differentiate Japan culturally and promote 
Japan’s image in the world to itself and to the rest of the world. It may 
have been often overstated and overplayed, sometimes naive and twee, at 
times woefully inaccurate and anachronistic; and (like every other nation’s 
patriotism) may come across these days as quite irritating and cringe-worthy 
for modern readers of a post-nationalist persuasion. But it was by no means 
aggressive, xenophobic, or sinister. On the contrary, it was a patriotism that 
was very much enjoyed in its time by many non-Japanese, as the popular 
reception of Zen Buddhism and its Influence on Japanese Culture in the 
1930s would attest.
 However, whilst Suzuki’s patriotism was harmless politically, it does 
present a serious drawback to his philosophical system. This is because 
Suzuki often tended to conflate with his ontology, a certain supposed Zen-
influenced worldview Japanese people had, that is, a Japanese specific-
epistemology, a Japanese way of knowing and seeing reality. In other words, 
in sections of his writing, it seems that Suzuki is arguing that for the Japanese 
the world is non-dualistic and for Westerners it is dualistic. Importantly, this 
is not the same as saying that the world is seen as non-dualistic by Japanese 
and is seen as dualistic by Westerners. For in establishing an ontological 
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category of non-differentiated differentiation, as he does with his ‘capping 
concepts’, Suzuki seems to have made a flawed move by applying this 
all-embracing ontology to the culture-specific spiritual experiences of the 
Japanese people. For instance, in his book Nihontekireisei, (written with 
impeccable bad-timing in the early 1940s), he purports the idea that the 
Japanese have a special type of spirituality, that Japanese people exist in 
non-differentiated differentiation. He writes, “The individual person each 
exist by themselves but they are supra-individuals just as they are. This 
spiritual direct awakening first appeared with the Japanese so it can be called 
‘Japanese spirituality’”. (2000: 118)3. Further on he writes, “A person is a 
supra-individual person and forms the center of an infinite circle with no 
center. Spiritual direct awakening is established when this center-less center 
is recognized. When that happens one becomes the person of ‘In heaven and 
earth, I alone am the honored one’. This is the true individual—the self-limits 
of the supra-individual. The contradiction of the non-individual individual 
is recognized as the most concrete truth and its existence obtains ultimate-
ness.” (2000: 136)4. Reading these words, one cannot avoid the suspicion that 
Suzuki has misunderstood his own ontology, or has unwittingly distorted it to 
suit parochial concerns. For it seems that Suzuki is confusing what a person 
is with what a person sees. If we understand “spiritual direct awakening”, a 
favorite capping concepts of his, to mean the ontology of non-differentiated 
differentiation, then it is hard to reconcile it with the way he has employed 
it here to describe mere culturally determined “awareness” of this supposed 
non-differentiated differentiation. He has confused his own descriptions of 
how we are, what we are, what are being-ness is, with descriptions of what 
certain among us can see and are aware of. He has gone from describing 
the realm of “no-mind” to describing the specific “mind of the Japanese”. It 
seems he is muddled in a confusion between ways of seeing and what it is 
that is seen, between the epistemological and the ontological. It is a confusion 
well summarized by Peter Medawar’s notorious comment quoted in Wheen 
(2004: 87):
 “I am reminded of an air-raid warden in wartime Oxford who, when 
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bright moonlight seemed to be defeating the spirit of the blackout, 
exhorted us to wear dark glasses. He, however, was being funny on 
purpose.”
 The criticism being that there should be a clear distinction made in any 
coherent philosophy between how we look at reality and the nature of that 
reality we look upon. Of course, a Suzuki philosophy may counter that 
the seer and the seen are one, and that the ontological and epistemological 
are false distinctions. Yet, in saying that we are effectively making the 
assumption that how we look at reality can change that reality, that wearing 
dark-glasses makes the moonshine disappear from the sky for all. This is 
obviously untenable. However, a Suzuki philosophy may further counter 
that it is not a case of the way we see reality determining that reality but 
that reality determining the way we see it. But if this is the case, why then 
has this reality selected that it be seen correctly exclusively by the Japanese. 
Suggesting that the seer and the seen are one for the Japanese puts one on the 
slippery-slope to a divine chosen race style of conclusion, something I am 
confident Suzuki never meant.
 Unfortunately it seems that Suzuki, in overstating the special mode of 
being of the Japanese, with their special spiritual fusion with the world (a 
fusion so strong that, as Suzuki suggests elsewhere in Nihontekireisei, Amida 
Butsu chants her divine name through Japanese lips in a fusion of tariki and 
jiriki) he is giving his metaphysics a cultural location and, in his enthusiasm 
to promote the uniqueness of Japanese philosophy, is misunderstanding his 
own capping concepts and assuming that because Japanese philosophy had a 
particular place in history, the philosophy itself can only have a particular and 
partial application to reality.
Conclusion
 I have attempted to argue here that D.T. Suzuki should be recognized as 
a philosopher of some creativity and originality who described the insights 
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of Zen with a system of concepts that were radically innovative and which 
provided a new set of concepts for the West to articulate some of the major 
belief systems of East Asia. However, concurrent with this is that fact that 
Suzuki was very much embedded in an historically-specific ideology which 
saw vast differences between the Orient and the Occident and which saw 
national cultures as monolithic determiners of every aspect of the human 
mind, including, confusingly, that minds integration with its own primordial 
state of no-mindedness. The task when studying Suzuki is to appreciate 
his unique innovations in terms of their philosophical expression whilst 
separating him from certain ideas of his that now seem dated, parochial, and 
which, most importantly, contradict and cheapen his formidable stature as a 
philosopher and original thinker.
Notes
1  Original text:
  フランスの哲学者のデカルトに有名なCogito ergo sumというのがある、 
「われ考う、ゆえに、われあり」との義であるが、お釈迦さんの立場──す
なわち禅では初めから「我有焉」である、「我考う」は後からついて来る。
これが実に絶対肯定であり、絶対矛盾の同一性である、不揀択すなわち無分
別の分別である。
2  Original text:
  この即非論理は禅思想史を通じてもっとも重要なものであることは疑いな
い。禅は実にこれを行為的に翻訳したものである。
3  Original text:
  個己の一人は一人一人で、しかもそれがそのままに超個己の一人であるの
である。この霊性的直覚は日本人の上に初めてでたので、これを日本的霊性
といわなければならぬのである。
4  Original text:
  一人は超個己的一人で、中心のない無限大円環の中心を形成するところ
のものである。霊性的自覚は、この中心のない中心を認得するときに成立す
る。そのとき「天上天下唯我独尊」の一人者になるのである。それが真実の
個己─超個己の自己限定である。個己でない個己という矛盾が即ち最も具体
的事実として認得せられ、この存在が究意性をもってくるのである。
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